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Abstract—Increasingly, trust has played a crucial role in the
security of an IoT system from its inception to the end of its
lifecycle. A device has to earn some level of trust even before it
is authenticated for admission to the system. Furthermore, once
the device is admitted to the system, it may behave maliciously
over time; hence its behavior must be evaluated constantly in the
form of trust to ensure the integrity of the system. Currently,
no mechanism exists to establish an initial trust on a device,
without prior knowledge, before its admission to an IoT system.
Even when trust is applicable, trust evaluation models require
direct/indirect observations over time, historical data on past
encounters, or third party recommendations. However, this type
of past data is not available in the first encounter between the
system and the device. The question is how to establish whether
a device can be trusted to a level that merits further evaluation
for admission into a mobile and dynamic IoT system when it
encounters the system for the first time? This paper addresses
this challenge by proposing a challenge-response method and a
trust assessment model to establish, without prior knowledge,
the initial trust that a device places on another in a mobile and
dynamic environment called personal space IoT. The initial trust
is established before further interaction can take place and under
the assumption that only a limited window of time is available
for the trust assessment. The paper describes and evaluates the
proposed model theoretically and by simulation. It also describes
a practical scheme for realizing the proposed solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
A personal space IoT system refers to a group of implanted
and wearable devices providing services to a user, and other
devices that are within the wireless communication radius of
the users devices. In this system, a smartphone or a capability-
comparable device acts as the centralized controller, managing
of the space including admitting devices and monitoring their
activities. As defined in [1], an IoT system can be modelled as
a mobile entity whose constituents vary dynamically. Figure 1
illustrates the personal space IoTs where each circle represents
one personal space IoT system.
The operation of an IoT system, particularly a personal
space IoT system, mainly relies on the cooperation and inter-
connection among devices. In addition, the personal space IoT
system often operates in a hostile environment where there is
high density of malicious and intruders. Existing IoT systems
rely on authentication approaches for establishing secure com-
munications among devices [2]. However, during the operation
phase, an authenticated device may behave maliciously over
time by not cooperating with others, providing inaccurate
data or poor services to gain its own benefits. Moreover,
an authenticated device may deploy improper system tear-
down or decommission to cause damage afterward. In fact,
trust has been used to monitor device’s behavior and detect
malicious device. In order to guarantee the integrity of the
system, the device’s behavior must be evaluated constantly in
the form of trust not only from its admission to the system but
also its entire lifecycle. Specifically, the device must establish
some level of trust before it is authenticated for admission
to the system. Furthermore, it also needs to keep on being a
trustworthy member of the system. Relying on the initial trust
level to admit devices is thus essential for creating a secure
personal space IoT system and the trust assessment algorithm
plays the crucial role in the process.
Currently, no existing work has yet attempted to provide a
solution for establishing the initial trust on an entity, without
prior knowledge and before its admission to the system.
Several trust models proposed for IoT rely on trust evidences
from direct/indirect observations over time, historical data in
past encounters, or recommendations. However, such trust
information is not available at the first encounter between the
device and the IoT system. The proposed trust models only
evaluate trust level of devices after they are admitted to the
system. Therefore, a trust assessment model for establishing
the initial trust on a device on its first encounter is needed.
The question is how to establish this initial trust on a device
when the pre-knowledge about the device is not available at
the first encounter? One view is that it is reasonable to place an
initialized trust value equally to all devices. This assumption
has been used in existing trust models which only assess trust
degree of devices after a long operational period to detect
the misbehaving devices [3]. However, the initialized value
does not represent the real behavior of all devices. Another











Fig. 1: The real world personal space IoTs
the device by assessing its behavior. A possible approach
is to aggregate a committee to judge the trustworthiness of
the device at the instance of its encounter with the system
[4]. In the personal space IoT scenario, collective community
judgment is not feasible and only a limited amount of time
is available for establishing the initial trust. To overcome this
obstacle, we propose a challenge-response method whereby
the initial trust on a device is to be established by the controller
through the uncertainty level of the device’s behavior cap-
tured from challenge-response rounds. Although the challenge-
response technique has been used in authentication methods
[5], [6], their purposes are different from our challenge-
response mechanism as they only verify the device’s identity
without concerning on trustworthiness of the device. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to establish initial
trust value on a device by utilizing the challenge-response
mechanism during the first encounter of the device and the
system.
In this paper, we propose a challenge-response-based initial
trust assessment model to establish the initial trust level that a
device places on another at their first encounter. The challenge-
response mechanism is used to create the knowledge about
the device by learning the uncertainty level in its behavior.
The initial trust assessment model then relies on the results
of the challenge-response process to assess if a device can
be trusted to a level that can be used for its admission
to the personal space IoT system. We extensively evaluate
our proposed model theoretically and via simulation. Results
show that the challenge-response mechanism can capture the
behavior of the device properly. The initial trust assessment
model allows a mobile and dynamic system to establish initial
trust level on devices within a limited time period at the
beginning of their first encounter. We also describe a realistic
scheme for realizing the proposed solution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides related work. Section III describes our challenge-
response method and the initial trust assessment model.
Section IV presents the evaluation of our proposed model
via simulation. Section V describes a practical scheme for
realization of the solution. Finally, section VI concludes the
paper and suggests directions for future research.
II. RELATED WORK
Trust has increasingly played an important role in the
security of an IoT system from its inception to the end of
its lifecycle. In the literature, a number of trust management
systems investigating computational trust models have been
introduced in wireless networks and in the context of IoT [7].
In computational trust models, Bayesian approaches have been
widely used in reputation systems to evaluate trust [8]–[11].
Ganeriwal et al. [9] introduced a classical beta reputation-
based framework for sensor networks where nodes use repu-
tation to evaluate other’s trust level. In this work, a node esti-
mates the reputation of other nodes based on their transactions
over a period and reputation information recommended by its
neighbors. By fitting the distribution of the node’s reputation
to Beta distribution, the authors define the trust level of a node
as the statistic expectation value of the Beta probability density
function (pdf) associated with its reputation.
In [11], a probabilistic trust management model is proposed
based on the experience of previous interactions and recom-
mendations. The trust value is influenced by the expectation
value of the Beta distributed probability of a satisfactory inter-
action where the pre-knowledge about the number of previous
satisfied and unsatisfied interactions from direct observations
and recommendations are recorded. However, in this approach
devices must keep lists of all historical interactions with others.
Similarly, Chen et al. [8] proposed a trust management for
service oriented architecture based IoT by adopting Bayesian
framework as the underlying model for evaluating direct trust
towards a service from user’s experience. The trust value is the
weighted combination of his satisfactory direct experience and
recommendations from his friends. This work requires entities
to maintain their past observations of all other entities in the
system.
In [10], Sun et al. argued differently that uncertainty can be
used as a measure of trust. The trust value can be calculated
by determining the degree of uncertainty in the future action
of an agent. When the direct observation is not available, the
uncertainty is measured through concatenation and multipath
propagation of recommendations. However, these techniques
result in a degradation of trust value when it is propagated via
a series of recommenders.
Our work differs from previous work as we introduce an
initial trust assessment model which conducts a challenge-
response process to establish initial trust on a device before
it is admitted into a mobile and dynamic IoT system. We
propose the challenge-response mechanism that allows device
to generate the evidence for trust computation instead of
waiting for the recommendations or actual interactions for a
long period.
III. CHALLENGE-RESPONSE-BASED INITIAL TRUST
ASSESSMENT MODEL
This section describes our proposed challenge-response-
based initial trust assessment model. We first describe the
challenge-response mechanism for evaluating the uncertainty
level in a device’s behavior that encounters the system for
the first time. Then, we explain how the uncertainty level is
measured from the results of the challenge-response process
through information entropy. Finally, we present the translation
of the uncertainty level to the initial trust value.
A. Challenge-response mechanism
The challenge-response mechanism is a process of creating
knowledge about a device by investigating its behavior towards
challenges. It is performed intentionally by the controller
at the creation phase of a personal space IoT system to
investigate the uncertainty level about a device’s behavior.
The process contains several challenges that the controller
requests responses from a mobile/non-mobile device before
its admission to the system. A challenge can be a request
for the knowledge about the surrounding environment. It can
be an action that the device must perform properly. The type
of challenges varies depending on the applications that the
personal space IoT system supports or the environment where
the system is operating.
Each challenge followed by a response can be considered as
a challenge-response round. The result of a challenge-response
round is either an expected response or an unexpected response
provided by the device under testing. Once a round completed,
the obtained result will be combined with previous results to
form the knowledge about the device that is utilized to measure
the uncertainty level in its behavior.
During the challenge-response process, the uncertainty level
in a device’s behavior is measured via information entropy.
Then, the initial trust value that the controller places on the
tested device will be computed from the uncertainty level.
Now, the question is that given the results from the conducted
challenge-response rounds, how to measure the uncertainty
level in the device’s behavior?
B. Uncertainty measurement
The base of uncertainty measurement is the probability. In
our initial trust assessment model, the probability associated
with the uncertainty level in a device’s behavior refers to
the probability that the device will behave as expected to
a challenge, or equivalently the probability that the device
provides an expected response to a challenge.
In [1] we proposed an approach to measure the uncertainty
level through a conditional probability associated with the trust
relationship between the controller and a device. The calcu-
lation of this conditional probability relies on the probability
that a device is considered as an expected device given its
response to a challenge and the probability that the controller
trusts a response from this device. For a more feasible solution,
in this paper we measure the uncertainty amount in a device’s
behavior through Bayesian analysis where the posterior model
describes the distribution of the probability associated to the
uncertainty measurement conditional on the results from the
challenge-response mechanism.
Prior to any challenge-response rounds, the probability
associated with the uncertainty level of a device’s behavior
is a random variable which is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]
as there is no pre-knowledge about the device’s behavior.
When the result from each challenge-response round occurs,
this probability value could reasonably be distributed over a
smaller scope as there is more evidence on how the device
behaves to the challenge. The posterior distribution of this
probability will be derived from the prior distribution and the
results of the challenge-response process to reflect our new
information about the device’s behavior.
Let θ denote the probability associated with the uncertainty
level in a device’s behavior. To estimate the value of θ, we first
assign a prior distribution to θ, p(θ), that is associated with the
uncertainty in device’s behavior before any challenge-response
rounds. Initially, θ is an unknown parameter and equally likely
to take all values between 0 and 1 inclusive. It is reasonable






To represent the non-informative prior distribution of θ before
any challenge-response rounds, we can choose parameters α =
β = 1.
The challenge-response rounds in our initial trust assess-
ment model are considered as binary events with two possible
outcomes. Let R denote the outcome from one round. Thus,
R can take a value in {0, 1} that reflects the unexpected
response or expected response, respectively. In this paper, we
design independent challenge-response rounds for estimating
the value of θ. The probability that the outcome R will occur in
each challenge-response round given the unknown probability
θ can be expressed as follows.
p(R | θ) = θR(1− θ)1−R (2)
Once a challenge-response round completed, the posterior
distribution of θ can be updated by applying Bayes’ theorem.





Replacing (1) and (2) to (3), the expression of the posterior
distribution of θ becomes as below.







B(α+R, β + 1−R)
(4)
The expression in (4) shows that the posterior probability
of θ has a Beta distribution with parameters (α + R) and
(β + 1 − R) where α and β are parameters of the prior
distribution before the current round takes place. It can be
seen that, when the outcome from the first round occurs,
the posterior distribution of θ has Beta distribution with
parameters (1 + R) and (1 + 1 − R) as its prior distribution
is non-informative.
The estimation of θ in subsequent challenge-response
rounds will take the previous updated posterior distribution of
θ as the prior distribution. Updating from the prior distribution
and the outcomes of the challenge-response rounds by the
same way, the posterior distribution of θ after n rounds
p(θ | R1R2 . . . Rn) is again Beta distribution with parameters
(1 + nR̄) and (1 + n − nR̄) where R̄ = 1n
∑n
i=1Ri and
Ri ∈ {0, 1}.
As θ is a probability variable, for a given θ the probability
density p(θ | R̄) represents the probability that θ has a specific
value. Since the variable θ is continuous, the second-order
probability p(θ | R̄) for any given value of θ in [0, 1] is very
small and hence meaningless [12]. It is only meaningful to
compute the posterior expectation value of θ:





+ R̄× (1− 2
n+ 2
) (5)
The form of posterior expectation value calculation in (5)
shows that when we conduct a large number of challenge-
response rounds, i.e., n grows very large, the posterior expec-
tation value of θ mainly relies on the mean of observation
results.













































Fig. 2: Uncertainty measurement with associated probability
Information theory states that entropy is a nature measure of
uncertainty. We measure the uncertainty level in the device’s
behavior by using the Shannon entropy [13].
H(x) = −xlog2(x)− (1− x)log2(1− x) (6)
where x = E[θ | R̄] is the posterior expectation value of θ that
represents the probability associated to the uncertainty level in
device’s behavior after a number of challenge-response rounds.
C. Initial trust computation
Figure 2 shows the uncertainty level in the device’s behavior
measured from the associated probability that refers to the
posterior expectation value of θ, i.e., E[θ | R̄], taking a
value from [0, 1]. In fact, trust is an increasing function of
the probability. Trust value should be increased when the
probability that the device behaves as expected increases from
0 to 1.
In our trust model, the proportion of (nR̄ + 1) to n + 2
decides the uncertainty level in the device’s behavior. The
maximum value of the uncertainty level about the device’s
behavior is at 1 when the device provides the expected
responses and the unexpected responses equally. In this case,
trust should be a neutral value to indicate that there is no trust
or distrust places on this device. In addition, the uncertainty
level reduces from 1 to 0 when the associated probability
spreads far away from 0.5 towards 0 or 1. As the uncertainty
level is a symmetric function of the probability, it reaches
nearly 0 when either nR̄ + 1  n + 2 or nR̄ + 1 ∼ n + 2.
The corresponding trust value should be interpreted to −1
which refers to a full distrust opinion places on the device
that provided unexpected responses to all the challenges. In
contrast, the trust value should be interpreted to 1 which
indicates a complete trust opinion places on the device that
behaved as expected in all the challenges.
To interpret the uncertainty level of the device’s behavior
to the trust value, (7) is used [10], where x = E[θ | R̄].
T =
{
1−H(x), if 0.5 ≤ x ≤1
H(x)− 1, if 0 ≤ x <0.5
(7)
The mapping in (7) satisfies the requirements for the trust
metric as discussed above. Figure 2 also illustrates our in-
terpretation of uncertainty level to initial trust value with



































































































Fig. 3: Investigated values changing over 7 C-R rounds with
all expected responses
associated probabilities. The trust level depicts a value from
the range of [−1, 1] which can represent a full distrust, a less
distrust, a neutral trust, a more trust or a complete trust opinion
when the associated probability increases from 0 to 1.
It is important to end the initial trust assessment process
within the creation phase of the personal space IoT system.
We set thresholds for the initial trust to ensure that the trust
assessment process ends upon the established initial trust value
reach a given threshold.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents the evaluation of our proposed model
via simulation and discusses the obtained results. To study
fully the behavior of the proposed model and the impact
of salient parameters under various circumstances, we will
not impose the time limit or the number of iterations in the
challenge-response (C-R) process in our investigation below.
In the experiment, we conduct a challenge-response process
with seven C-R rounds where each new device will be tested
with seven challenges by the controller. We investigate how the
posterior pdf, expectation value of the associated probability,
the corresponding uncertainty level and initial trust value
change during the challenge-response process with various
cases of device’s responses.
Figures 3 shows the change of investigated values when
a device provides expected responses to all challenges. The
curve representing the posterior pdf has gradually shifted
to the right side when more expected responses received
from the device. The expectation value of the probability
associated with device’s behavior increases from 0.68 to 0.88
that leads to a reduction in the uncertainty level. The initial
trust value increases from 0.1 to around 0.48 which refers
to a trust opinion placed on the device because it provided
good behavior consistently through challenge-response rounds.
After the challenge-response process, the controller gains more
knowledge concerning the device and places an initial trust
value of 0.48 on the device.
Figure 4 presents the change of investigated values during
the challenge-response process when a device provides unex-
pected responses to all challenges. Since the device behaved
badly in all rounds, the posterior pdf has gradually shifted to
the left side. Consequently, the expectation value of associated
probability continuously reduces from 0.34 to 0.11. Thus, the



































































































Fig. 4: Investigated values changing over 7 C-R rounds with
all un-expected responses



































































































Fig. 5: Investigated values changing over 7 C-R rounds
with three first expected responses followed by unexpected
responses
corresponding measured uncertainty level reduces to around
0.5. Although the uncertainty level measured in this case
is similar to that in the first case, the initial trust value is
interpreted to -0.48 which refers to a distrust opinion placed
on the device because it continuously provided bad behavior.
Figure 5 summarizes the change of investigated values
during the experiment when a device provides expected re-
sponses at three first challenges and unexpected responses
at subsequent challenges. The uncertainty level reduces over
three first rounds and increases again to a very high value when
the device provides bad behavior at the subsequent rounds. The
corresponding initial trust value increases from a neutral value
to 0.2 in three first rounds and drops to a neutral value as the
device does not provide good behavior consistently.
Figure 6 illustrates the change of investigated values in case
a device provides unexpected responses to two first challenges
and expected responses to subsequent challenges. It can be
seen that the curve of the posterior pdf is narrower and shifted
to the right side and the expectation value reduces in two first
rounds and increases over five subsequent rounds. The initial
trust value drops to -0.5 which refers to a distrust opinion over
two first rounds as the device provided unexpected responses.
Although the device provides expected responses in the five
subsequent challenges, the initial trust value increases to a
small trust value at 0.07. This indicates that the controller
only establishes a low trust level on this device.

































































































Fig. 6: Investigated values changing over 7 C-R rounds with
two first unexpected response followed by expected responses
In summary, the results show that our challenge-response
mechanism learns the device’s behavior effectively. Based on
this knowledge, the controller places an initial trust opinion
on devices that behaved as expected consistently to the chal-
lenges.
V. PRACTICAL REALIZATION
In this section, we describe a practical realization of our
proposed solution to a personal space IoT system. Note that
our initial trust assessment model relies on the results from
the challenge-response process at the creation phase of the
personal space IoT system where devices encounter the system
for the first time. The challenge-response process is conducted
during the first encounter of devices and the system by
deploying interactions between devices and the controller.
In a practical personal space IoT system, the controller
discovers nearby devices and admits devices that are suited to
the system’s requirements by establishing secure connections
with them during the initial phase. The number of interactions
between a device and the controller during their first encounter
depends on the underlying communication technology used
by the devices. The devices in personal space IoT system
generally use Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) or other short-
range communication technologies for its communication with
each other. Without loss of generality, we analyze the device’s
interactions during the creation phase of a personal space IoT
system, where devices are connected and communicated with
one another via BLE, to realize the practical implementation
of our proposed solution.
Generally, BLE devices discover others during a discovery
phase and establish secure connection with others through
a pairing process. Figure 7 illustrates typical interactions
between a controller and a device via BLE during their
connection establishment at their first encounter. During the
discovery phase, there are several interactions between devices
for exchanging their identities and additional information such
as the device type, service, manufacturer information, etc.,
through advertising, scan request and scan response packets.
The devices participate in a pairing process when one of them
initiates a connection request packet. During the pairing pro-
cess, two devices exchange information of their input/output
capabilities, random numbers and confirmation values for the














Check for confirm value match
If check fails, abort
Pairing_Confirm2(C)
Pairing_Confirm2(D)
Check for confirm value match
If check fails, abort
Check for confirm value match
If check fails, abort
Check for confirm value match
If check fails, abort
Fig. 7: BLE device’s interactions during connection establish-
ment
pairing” or “LE secure connection pairing” model can be
used. In Figure 7, the LE secure connection pairing model is
used. There are six pairs of interactions between two devices
during their first encounter before they confirm whether the
peer device is authenticated.
In BLE, the information exchanging over the pairing process
is transferred in plain-text, except for the confirmation values
which are outputs of AES-based functions. It is reasonable to
add challenge and response information into packets that carry
the plain-text information exchanging over the discovery and
pairing processes. In fact, custom information can be included
to advertising packets in BLE before establishing a connection.
Beacons are implementation of using advertisements with BLE
for simple information broadcast [14], [15]
For the example shown in Figure 7, our challenge-response
process utilizes at least four pairs of interactions that exchange
information in plain-text to conduct four challenge-response
rounds (all arrows except for black ones represents the in-
teractions will be used for challenge-response rounds). The
number of rounds may increase if more than one pair of
scan request and scan response packets are exchanged. It is
clear that our challenge-response method can be conducted
during the discovery and connection establishment phase,
where devices encounter the system and establish a connection
with each other, and before device is authenticated. Beacons
are deployed for exchanging challenge-response information.
Before authentication, the controller establishes the initial trust
level on the testing device and decides if it is trusted to a
certain level that can be used to support its admission to the
system.
In fact, the possible interactions between two devices during
the creation phase of the system might be insufficient for
the challenge-response process to establish an initial trust on
a device. To deal with the limited number of interactions,
we design an efficient compression or encoding approach
whereby multiple binary responses can be derived from a sin-
gle challenge-response result. Investigating efficient encoding
techniques for this purpose is underway.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a challenge-response-based initial trust
assessment model for personal space IoT systems. The pro-
posed trust assessment model relies on the results from a
challenge-response mechanism conducted at the initial stage of
the system to measure uncertainty level in the device’s behav-
ior and then interpret it to initial trust value. The experimental
results show that our proposed challenge-response mechanism
can estimate effectively the uncertainty of a device’s behavior.
Realization shows that the challenge-response method fits
nicely to possible interactions between devices during their
first encounter. For future research, we are investigating the
multi-level trust for establishing initial trust on a device. We
plan to develop a trust assessment framework that combines
the proposed initial trust model with existing models to inves-
tigate trust level of entities throughout the system’s lifecycle.
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